Optimal Sabotage Attack on Composite Material Parts by Ranabhat, Bikash et al.
Optimal Sabotage Attack on Composite Material Parts
Bikash Ranabhat, Joseph Clements, Jacob Gatlin, Kuang-Ting Hsiao, Mark Yampolskiy
University of South Alabama
ABSTRACT
Industry 4.0 envisions a fully automated manufacturing environ-
ment, in which computerized manufacturing equipment—Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS)—performs all tasks. These machines are
open to a variety of cyber and cyber-physical attacks, including
sabotage. In the manufacturing context, sabotage attacks aim to
damage equipment or degrade a manufactured part’s mechanical
properties. In this paper, we focus on the latter, specifically for
composite materials. Composite material parts are predominantly
used in safety-critical systems, e.g., as load-bearing parts of aircraft.
Further, we distinguish between the methods to compromise var-
ious manufacturing equipment, and the malicious manipulations
that will sabotage a part. As the research literature has numerous
examples of the former, in this paper we assume that the equipment
is already compromised; our discussion is solely on manipulations.
We develop a simulation approach to designing sabotage attacks
against composite material parts. The attack can be optimized by
two criteria, minimizing the “footprint” of manipulations. We simu-
late two optimal attacks against the design of a spar, a load bearing
component of an airplane wing. Our simulation identifies the mini-
mal manipulations needed to degrade its strength to three desired
levels, as well as the resulting failure characteristics. Last but not
least, we outline an approach to identifying sabotaged parts.
KEYWORDS
Sabotage Attack, Additive Manufacturing, Composite Materials,
Carbon Fiber Reinforced Polymer, Safety, Security
1 INTRODUCTION
Industry 4.0 and Factory of the Future movements envision fully
automated manufacturing environments, in which computerized
manufactured equipment– Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)– perform
all tasks. These are vulnerable to a variety of cyber and cyber-
physical attacks, as has been shown for CPS. However, as opposed
to equipment sabotage attacks like Stuxnet [1], manufacturing
sabotage attacks might aim to degrade the mechanical properties
of the manufactured part. This can lead to the destruction of a
system employing such a part. The dr0wned study [2] provides
an experimental proof of these attacks; in the study, researchers
sabotaged a replacement propeller for a quad-copter UAV, leading to
the quad-copter’s destruction after the propeller broke mid-flight.
In this paper we focus on composite materials, which are com-
monly used in safety-critical systems. The aerospace industry was
an early adopter of this innovation, and composite use in aerospace
has increased drastically over time. For instance, the Boeing 787 is
50% composite by weight [3, 4]. The defense industry also favors
composite materials. Composite application areas include aerospace
structures (tails, wings and fuselages), missile components (rocket
motor cases, nozzles, igniters, inter-stage structures), boat construc-
tion, bicycle frames, and racing car bodies (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Composite Material Market, 2016 (Source: [5])
Most large composite parts are manufactured through automated
processes, instead of the traditional labor-intensive hand-layup pro-
cesses that are still popular for small parts. Incorporating automated
processes like automatic fiber placement, automated tape layup,
filament winding, etc. for manufacturing composites raise secu-
rity concerns. Increased computerization and a key place in the
aerospace and defense industries make composite material manu-
facturing an attractive target for cyber- and cyber-physical attacks.
While we are not aware of any prior publications discussing sabo-
tage attacks on composite material parts, the possibility of sabotage
attacks has already been empirically proven for Additive Manufac-
turing (AM, a.k.a. 3D Printing) with plastics andmetals. In AM, it has
been shown that sabotage attacks can degrade a part’s mechanical
strength [6–8] or fatigue life [2].
The contributions of this paper are as follows. We demonstrate
that sabotage attacks on composite material parts are possible,
define two categories of optimal sabotage attacks on composite
material parts, and present a simulation tool developed to calculate
both categories of optimal attacks. We further discuss the properties
of these optimal attacks, and outline approaches that might be used
to identify sabotaged composite material parts.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, based on the
current state of the art, we present the composite material manufac-
turing foundation of our approach. After discussing the considered
threat model and related assumptions in Section 3, in Section 4 we
define both categories of optimal sabotage attacks and outline the
algorithms used to calculate them, for a given part and degradation
requirements. We present and discuss the properties of the achieved
optimal attacks in Section 5. We outline possible approaches to
identify sabotage attacks in Section 6. After discussing sabotage
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Figure 2: Laminate, Lamina, Mid- and End-Planes
attacks identified for AM in Section 7, we conclude this paper with
a brief overview of the presented work and conclusions from it.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide background material for composite mate-
rials and their manufacturing relevant to this paper. In Appendix A
we summarize a mathematical method that is well-established in
materials science for the calculation of a composite material’s me-
chanical properties.
2.1 Carbon Fiber Reinforced Polymer (CFRP)
Composite materials are the combination of two or more materials
with different sets of properties. The composite benefits from the
best properties of each of the combined materials or achieves a
new set of properties which are unique and cannot be achieved in
either of the individual materials. Despite their high cost, composite
materials have gained popularity in high performance products that
need to be lightweight but able to bear large loads.
This paper primarily considers Carbon Fiber Reinforced Polymer
(CFRP), a composite that is very popular in the aerospace and
automotive industries because of its high strength-to-weight ratio.
CFRP derives its strength from sheets of carbon fiber that are bound
together with a polymer-like epoxy. Individual sheets of carbon
fiber are referred to as lamina or plies, and the complete composite
as a laminate (see Figure 2).
Each individual carbon fiber lamina shows strong anisotropic
properties, i.e., mechanical characteristics like strength and stiffness
are different in different directions. To control this anisotropy, lami-
nas are placed in the laminate at different angles. Figure 3 shows the
local and global axes of an angle lamina. Vectors 1 and 2 represent
the local coordinate axes whereas x and y are the global coordinate
axes. Vector 1 lies along the fiber length direction, which represents
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Figure 3: 1/2 and X/Y Axes in Composite Materials
longitudinal direction. Vector 2 is normal to the fiber length and
represents transverse direction for the lamina. The global coordi-
nate system (x-y) is related to the local coordinate system by the
angle (Θ).
In Appendix A we have summarized the well-established equa-
tions commonly used to calculate the mechanical properties of
CFRP.
2.2 Computer Aided Manufacturing of
Composite Material
The composites industry is moving from hand layup to automated
processes. Automated Tape Layup (ATL) and Automated Fiber Place-
ment (AFP) are the current automated additive manufacturing
techniques for composites in the industry. ATL and AFP are per-
formed by Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines with
programmable axis movement, axis drives, and a printing head.
They place laminated tapes and tow layer by layer to produce a
specific part.
2.2.1 Automated Tape Layup. ATL can be considered an Addi-
tive Manufacturing process used to produce large simple composite
structures. ATL can lay prepared tape and continuous fabric strips
ranging from 75 to 300 mm wide onto a flat surface in different
orientations [9–11]. ATL heads are comprised of spools of tape,
a winder, winder guides, a compaction roller, a tape cutter, and a
position sensor. ATL composite production starts by depositing a
prepared tape onto a mold using a silicone roller. Subsequent layers
are deposited according to CNC paths defining the part geometry.
Once the layup is completed, the tape is cut automatically by ro-
tating or pinching blades. The speed of machine layup depends on
the complexity of the part. There is a reported 70-85% reduction in
man hours in the aerospace industry due to the implementation of
ATL techniques [12].
2.2.2 Automated Fiber Placement. The AFP process places bands
of material consisting of 2-32 individual tows or slit tape using
low tension and compaction pressure [13]. The tows are usually
1/8” to 1/4” wide. These tows can be laid at their own speed and
start/stop along the length of the band at the desired locations. The
use of robots allows the AFP process to be highly controllable and
repeatable. For fabrication, creel systems are loaded with tows of
composite tape. During band placement, individual tows are fed and
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cut as programmed by the program controller. The tows input to
the system pass in front of a heat source (laser, hot gas torched) and
under the consolidation device. The heat melts the tape, causing it
to stick to the substrate when pressed down by the consolidation
device. Once a band is placed, the tows are cut and the robot head
returns to place the next band. The process repeats band-by-band,
until a ply is complete, and then ply-by-ply until the final part is
produced.
2.3 Quality Assurance
Optical systems are being integrated by most manufacturers for in-
line quality control during the AFP process [10]. Fiber orientation is
an important parameter to monitor during manufacturing; sudden
changes in fiber orientation indicate defects such as gaps, overlaps,
twisted tows and contamination with foil. The strength and stiff-
ness of the composite laminate greatly depends on the orientation
sequence of the plies. Axial load is taken by 0◦ plies, shear load
by ±45◦ plies and transverse load by 90◦ plies. Fiber orientation is
therefore a major criterion for quality assurance (QA).
The optical system, Automated Ply Inspection (API), was devel-
oped by Flightware for NASA’s two AFP machines. It consists of
a sensor mounted in the AFP head [14]. A laser line is projected
on the layup surface. A commercial laser line scanner acquires the
optical measurement of the layup surface in a two-dimensional
profile, usually comprised of 1000-1500 discrete points. Automated
scanning generates a very accurate and dense point cloud that in-
cludes the minute details of the layup surface. The position of the
sensor in space at any instant is known so 2D data points from the
sensor could be converted into 3D coordinates in the part coordi-
nate system. Thus, lines of data points can be obtained hundreds of
times per second. Layup features of interest such as overlaps, edges,
gaps, splices, orientation etc. are embedded in the point cloud data
and layup surface points are plotted in 3D space. Comparing the
actual ply edge location to an expected ply edge location defined on
the part coordinate system helps determine the laydown accuracy
of the machine. The whole process is automated by the Flightware
software called Feature Detection.
3 THREAT MODEL & FOCUS OF THE PAPER
While we are not aware of any prior research on composite materi-
als security, composite manufacturing is quite similar to Additive
Manufacturing (AM), a.k.a. 3D Printing. For attacks on or with
AM, one should distinguish between attack vectors, compromised
elements, manipulations, and effects [15]. A variety of attack vectors
can be used to compromise one or more elements of the manu-
facturing process. The compromised element(s), their roles in the
process, and the degree to which an adversary can control these el-
ement(s) determine whichmanipulations an adversary can perform.
These manipulations, in conjunction with the type of manufactur-
ing process, manufacturing equipment, source materials, and object
application area, determine the achievable effects. Only a fraction
of the achievable effects intersect with the adversary’s goals. The
intersection of attack effects and adversarial goals are attack targets
(or threats). We consider these points valid for composite materials
manufacturing.
For AM, two major security threats identified in the research
literature are intellectual property theft [16–20] and sabotage at-
tacks [2, 6–8]. These threats are also present in composite materials.
In this paper, we focus explicitly on the latter threat category. Fur-
thermore, in the manufacturing context, sabotage attacks aim to
degrade a manufactured object’s material properties, damage man-
ufacturing equipment, or damage/contaminate the environment of
either the manufactured part or the manufacturing equipment [15].
This paper focuses solely on sabotage attacks aiming to degrade a
manufactured part’s mechanical properties.
Numerous real-world as well as academic attacks have proven
that a broad variety of classical cyber attack vectors can be used
to compromise computerized elements of a manufacturing pro-
cess. The most prominent real-world example remains the Stuxnet
attack [1], which has compromised both SCADA computers and
manufacturing equipment firmware (a uranium enrichment cen-
trifuge).
Examples from the closely related AM security literature (we
provide a more detailed description in Section 7) are also numerous.
Considering attack vectors, researchers have complained about
the lack of the security features associated with design files or de-
sign file transfer [21], identified that the employed software and
firmware have numerous vulnerabilities [22], exploited weaknesses
in the communication protocol to highjack the session [23], or used
social engineering to convince a user to open a malicious e-mail
attachment [2]. Compromised elements include computers that
store design files and control the manufacturing process [2, 6], com-
munication networks that connect these computers with the robo-
tized manufacturing equipment [23], the firmware installed on the
equipment [24, 25], or even an in-situ quality control system [26].
These compromised elements can stage a variety of manipulations,
including tampering of the design files [2, 6], manufacturing pa-
rameters [7, 8, 25], manufacturing process status information [26],
and altering communication timings or power supply [27, 28].
The fundamental difference between AM and composite materi-
als security lies in the parameters that determine the mechanical
properties of the manufactured part. This also determines which
malicious manipulations are available to an adversary to sabotage
a part’s quality.
Based on the prior discussion, we consider the following threat
model:
• Supported by prior work, we assume that one of the com-
puterized elements in the manufacturing process is com-
promised. It can be a PC that stores design files and controls
the overall manufacturing process, a computer network
that connects this PC and the roboticized ATL or AFP ma-
chine, or the firmware on this machine.
• In this paper, we focus on distinct manipulations that are
characteristic to all composite material parts–the orienta-
tion of individual plies in a laminate. This can be performed,
e.g., by modification of the design files on a compromised
computer. Other maliciousmanipulations like changing the
temperature-profile during the curing process are possible,
but are out of scope for this paper.
• Functional parts are typically designed with extreme tol-
erable operational conditions in mind. We assume that an
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adversary knows this and can discern the operational con-
ditions based on the design alone. Furthermore, we assume
that the adversarial goals can be tied to the (discernible)
operational conditions.
• Last but not least, the example of the–supposedly state-
actor staged–Stuxnet sabotage attack also shows that ad-
versaries will go to great lengths for attack stealthiness
while still achieving their goals. We therefore assume that
an adversary will be willing to minimize the malicious ma-
nipulations (in the case considered in this paper, changes of
the individual ply orientations) while still achieving their
stated goal (in the considered case, reducing the mechan-
ical properties to the level below discernible operational
conditions).
4 OPTIMAL SABOTAGE ATTACKS
The mechanical properties of a composite material directly depend
on several factors. The most important are the number of plies, the
material of individual plies, the orientations of individual plies, the
presence of defects like gaps or overlaps, and bonding between plies.
This paper alters only ply orientation, holding all other parameters
constant.
For part degradation sabotage attacks achieved through ply orien-
tation, we define two categories of optimization criteria: (i) minimal
amount of orientation deviation (∆Θ) for all plies, and (ii) minimal
number of plies whose orientation is changed. We consider attacks
that satisfy these criteria as optimal, because they minimize the
“footprint” of the attack while achieving the specified degradation
characteristics.
Based on the mathematical foundation described in Appendix A,
we developed a MATLAB program that takes as input an unaltered
composite material design (i.e., a sequence of plies, including their
material and orientation) and calculates both optimal attacks. The
simulation program consists of three functions, described in more
detail in this section.
The first calculates a strength ratio for each ply in a laminate; it
also determines the sequence in which the layers will fail as well as
the corresponding forces. The remaining two functions use the first
as a sub-routine and calculate two categories of optimal sabotage
attacks using defined optimization strategies.
4.1 Helper Function: Calculate Max Force and
Ply Failure Sequence
Please note that all equations referenced in this section are described
in Appendix A; these equations are well established in materials
science.
The flowchart in Figure 4 summarizes an algorithm that is used as
a core component in the calculation of both attack types described in
this section. This function is based on the algorithm for the Strength
Ratio (SR) calculation as described in Ramsaroop et al. [29]; our
modifications are indicated with a darker (sea blue) background.
The algorithm takes as its inputs the material properties, the
details of the laminates, a vector of resultant forces, and moments
indicating how the forces are distributed. The output of the algo-
rithm is an array of SR for all plies and the sequence of forces at
which plies fail.
Calculate Reduced 
Stiffness Matrix [Q]
Calculate Transposed 
Reduced Stiffness 
Matrix [Ǭ ]
Calculate Z 
Coordinates of 
End- and Mid-Planes
Calculate the 
Extension [A], 
Coupling [B], and 
Bending Stiffness [D] 
Matrices
Calculate Mid-Plane 
Strains and 
Curvatures
Calculate both Global 
and Local Stresses and 
Strains
Calculate Tsai-Wu 
Parameters
Calculate SR Values
Input: 
E1, E2, ν12, G12
Input: 
σT1, σT2, σC1, σC2, τ12  
Input: 
θ  
Input: 
N,M 
Input: 
T
Output: 
SR, Critical Force, Failed 
Plies
Search SR for Lowest Value
For all Layers that will Fail Next: 
Set Matrix [Ǭ] = [0]
All [Ǭ] == 0?
Inputs:
θ – The orientation sequence for the laminate structure 
E1 –  The elastic modulus parallel to the plies fiber direction
E2– The elastic modulus perpendicular to the plies fiber direction
ν12 – Poisson’s ratio in the 1-2 plain
G12 – The shear modulus
L – The number of layer in the laminate
T – The thickness of each layer in the laminate
N – The resultant forces
M – The resultant momentums
σT1 – Ultimate tensile strength parallel to the fibers
σT2 – Ultimate tensile strength perpendicular to the fibers
σC1 – Ultimate compressive strength parallel to the fibers
σC2  – Ultimate compressive strength perpendicular to the fibers
τ12 – Ultimate shear strength of the material
Outputs:
SR – Strength Ratio associated with each layer
Critical Force - The force at which the any one of the plies fail
Failed Plies – The list of plies that failed
Background Color Coding:
                              
Input: 
L
End
Yes
No
Shown in Materials Science Literature
Proposed in this Paper
Figure 4: Calculate Max Force and Ply Failure Sequence
We start with the input values of the Young’s modulus, Poisson’s
ratio, shear modulus (E1, E2, ν12, G12), and number of layers. We
use these values to calculate elements of the reduced stiffness ma-
trix [Q] according to the Equation 6. This matrix and the array of
the orientation (Θ) are then used to calculate the array of trans-
posed reduced stiffness matrices [Q] for each ply; the calculation is
performed according to the Equations 8 and 7.
We use the information about layer thickness and the number
of layers to calculate the Z coordinates of mid- and end-planes for
each ply (see Figure 2). The sign convention used here is positive
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for the downward layer and negative for the upward layer, with
the middle layer as reference.
We then use the previously computed transposed reduced stiff-
ness matrix [Q] and the coordinates of end-planes to calculate the
extensional stiffness matrix [A], coupling stiffness matrix [B], and
bending stiffness matrix [D] according to Equations 12, 13, and 14,
respectively. These matrices, the resultant forces N , and resultant
moments M are then used to calculate mid-plane strains ϵ0 and
curvatures k according to Equation 10.
All prior calculated values are used to determine the global and
local stresses and strains. For the calculation of global strains Equa-
tion 11 is used. We use Equation 5 to calculate global stresses. To
calculate local strain and stress, Equation 9 is used, which relies on
the values of the global strain and stress.
The components of Tsai-Wu failure theory are calculated us-
ing Equations 16 through 18; for this, the ultimate tensile stresses
(σT1,2)ult , the ultimate compressive stresses (σC1,2)ult , and the ul-
timate shear stress (τ12)ult are used. The Tsai-Wu parameters to-
gether with the previously determined local stress are then used to
calculate the laminate’s SR values, one per ply.
Up till this point, the described calculations are derived from
the approach layout in [29]. The remaining calculations have been
introduced in order to accommodate the specific needs of our algo-
rithms which determine optimal attacks.
After the SR values are calculated, the array is searched to find
the plies with the lowest SR value. These are the plies which fail
first. These plies fail at the force equal to the product of their SR
value and the resultant forces N and momentsM . We remove these
plies from the further considerations by setting their transposed
reduced stiffness matrix [Q] equal to [0].
If not all transposed reduced stiffness matrices [Q] have been set
to [0], this indicates that at least one ply has not failed yet and can
withstand the applied force. In this case, we re-enter the algorithm
at the stage when the extensional stiffness [A], coupling stiffness
[B], and bending stiffness matrices [D] are calculated. Otherwise,
all plies have failed and we can exit the algorithm.
During the algorithm, the following output values are calculated
and updated when necessary. The “Critical Force” is implemented
as an array of forces under which one or more plies will fail. With
every element of the array, a list of plies is associated that will fail
under this force.
4.2 Optimal Attack, Type One: Minimal
Changes per Individual Ply
The algorithm for the first attack type (see Figure 5) requires the
specification of the original laminate (layer thickness, ply orienta-
tion angles, and the number of layers), properties of the materials
in the laminate (Young’s modulus, Poisson’s ration, etc.), and the re-
sultant forces. Further, the algorithm takes into account two safety
factors (SF). The first SF specifies the ratio by which the original
composite design exceeds the expected operational conditions. The
target SF describes the desired degradation of composite’s mechan-
ical properties as a ratio of the expected operational conditions.
In the algorithm, based on the specifications of the original de-
sign, we calculate the critical force that this design can withstand.
Calculate Target Force
Inputs: 
Laminate Specification θ, T, L
Material Properties E1, E2, ν12, G12, σT1, σT2, σC1, σC2, τ12,
Resultant Forces N, M
Calculate Critical 
Force
(See Helper Function 
Diagram)
Inputs: 
Original Design SForiginal
Attack’s Target SFsabotaged
Current Plies = 
Middle Ply/Plies
Plies are force bearing?
Increment/Decrement Current Ply 
Pointers
No
Rotate plies
Yes
Calculate Critical 
Force
(See Helper Function 
Diagram)
Critical Force  >= Target Force
&& Current Ply <= Max Ply
Yes
No
Critical Force  >= Target Force
Recalculate Force 
Bearing Plies
(See Helper Function 
Diagram)
Yes
Output:
Array of Ply Orientations
End
No
Figure 5: Computation of Type 1 Optimal Sabotage Attack
This force together with both strength ratios is then used to calcu-
late the target critical force, the force under which the sabotaged
composite should fail.
We then enter a loop over all of the plies. For each iteration,
the algorithm uses two pointers to “Current Plies.” These are plies
that undergo modifications of their orientation. We initialize these
pointers to one or two middle plies (depending on the total amount
of plies used in the laminate). Then, we check whether these plies
are critical force bearing or not. If they are, we rotate the plies.
If the specified ply angle is negative, rotation is going to be in
the negative direction; otherwise, we rotate the ply in the positive
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direction. After rotation, the critical force is recalculated, using the
helper function described in Section 4.1 (see Figure 4) and the two
pointers to current plies are either incremented or decremented, so
that they traverse outwards. If the considered plies are not critical
force bearing, only the pointers are updated.
If, after the rotation of the current plies, the critical force still
exceeds the target and the end of the laminate is not yet reached, we
repeat the rotation process for the new current plies. If the target
force is reached, the algorithm returns the updated orientation of
all plies.
4.3 Optimal Attack, Type Two: Minimizing
Amount of Tampered Plies
The algorithm for the second attack type (see Figure 6) takes the
same parameters as the first. It also performs the same initial calcu-
lations to determine the critical and target forces. The current ply
initialization is also identical.
Starting with the current plies, the algorithm first tries to find
the next critical force bearing plies, traversing the sequence of plies
from the center outwards. If the algorithm can’t find a critical force
bearing ply, this means that no solution could be found.
Whenever a critical force bearing ply is found, the algorithm
begins rotating it. If a 1 degree positive rotation results in a higher
critical force, a 1 degree negative rotation is tried. Whichever ro-
tation direction resulted in a lower critical force is repeated until
it begins increasing again, indicating a local minimum. If the crit-
ical force is still above the target at this point, the next critical
force bearing ply is located and undergoes the same rotation pro-
cess. On reaching the target, the algorithm outputs the updated ply
orientations.
5 SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
To analyze a realistic scenario, we use the composite design of a
wing’s spar proposed in [30] for a small scale 20 seater WIG (Wing-
in-Ground Effect) vehicle. The composite consists of 34 layers of
Carbon Fiber Reinforced Polymer (CFRP) composite material. In
all our calculations we assumed a graphite fiber/epoxy composite
(a.k.a. carbon fiber/epoxy). The material properties for graphite
fiber/epoxy composite are summarized in Table 1 [31]. For each ply
in the composite material, an angle is specified. While the rotation
alters the ply’s mechanical properties in various directions, all plies
combined provide the mechanical properties required for the spar.
In our experimental evaluation, we have assumed that the me-
chanical properties were designed with an SF of 1.5. This is a com-
mon approach in the aerospace industry, in order to accommodate
for rare extreme conditions during operation as well as for uncer-
tainties in the manufacturing process, including possible impurities
of the source materials or deviation in the manufacturing process
like curing parameters.
In our simulation, we have used the specification of the compos-
ite design and the assumed SF to calculate the forces that the wing’s
spar should bear during normal operational conditions. Forces and
moments should be proportional to the assumed critical forces and
moments that will be applied to the wing structure. For the consid-
ered spar we use the vector of resultant forces N = (1, 0, 0) N /m
and resultant momentsM = (0, 0, 0) N /m.
Calculate Target 
Force
Calculate Critical Force
(See Helper Function 
Diagram)
Current Plies = 
Middle Ply/Plies
Current Ply 
<= Max Ply
Rotate Current Plies
Calculate Critical Force 
and 
Critical Force Bearing 
Plies
(See Helper Function 
Diagram)
Output:
Array of Ply Orientations
End
End
(No Solution Found)
Ply is Critical Force 
Bearing?
Increment/Decrement 
Current Ply Pointers
new Critical Force
 > old Critical Force
Undo and Reverse 
Rotation
Calculate Critical Force 
and 
Critical Force Bearing 
Plies
(See Helper Function 
Diagram)
New Critical Force
 > Old Critical Force?
Change rotation 
direction
Unmark Ply as Critical 
Force Bearing
Ply is Critical Force Bearing
&&
Critical Force  >= Target Force
New Critical Force
 > Old Critical Force?
Inputs: 
Laminate Specification θ, T, L
Material Properties E1, E2, ν12, G12, σT1, σT2, σC1, σC2, τ12,
Resultant Forces N, M
Inputs: 
Original Design SForiginal
Attack’s Target SFsabotaged
Yes
Yes
Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Figure 6: Computation of Type 2 Optimal Sabotage Attack
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Property Value
E1 181 GPa
E2 10.3 GPa
G12 7.17 GPa
ν12 0.28
(σT1 )ult 1500MPa
(σC1 )ult 1500MPa
(σT2 )ult 40MPa
(σC2 )ult 246MPa
(T12)ult 68MPa
Table 1: Material Properties for Graphite Fiber/Epoxy Com-
posite (Source: [31])
In order to evaluate several attack scenarios, we have simulated
attacks that will reduce the SF to three different values: 1.0, 0.9, and
0.8. For both attack types and the three targeted SF, we calculated
the necessary changes of the ply orientation. Table 2 summarizes
the results of our simulation. It also provides a quick reference for
the angle deviation between the altered and the original designs. At
the bottom of the table we summarize the maximum angle deviation
in both the positive and the negative directions. For each simulated
attack, we also provide a number of plies whose orientation was
altered or remained unaltered.
As defined in Section 4, a Type 1 attack attempts to achieve the
specified mechanical properties degradation while minimizing the
angle deviation between the tampered and the original ply orienta-
tion. For all considered degradation factors, the deviations are in
range between −12◦ and 15◦. Because of the optimization criteria,
most plies’ orientation must be altered. These angles of deviation
can be eventually detected during a manual layer inspection; the
number of plies affected increase the probability of detection even
if not all plies are inspected.
A Type 2 attack is optimized to minimize the number of lay-
ers that are altered. For the considered scenario and safety factor
degradation, up to 16 layers must be altered in the extreme case.
However, this optimization will require a large change in the ori-
entation angle, up to 43 degrees. These angles of deviation can
be easily detected during the manual inspection. However, if only
some layers are inspected, the attack may remain undetected.
Figure 7 depict how the attacks alter the critical forces at which
plies fail. The original design was optimized to have first ply failure
at the applied force of 2166 N /m in the x direction. At this force,
only four plies fail. The next failure would occur at a force of 2628
N /m in the x direction and lead to the failure of an additional eight
layers. Both of these failures occur well before the entire laminate
will fail at a force of 4125 N /m in the x direction. This behavior is
characteristic of composite part design and is known as progressive
failure. The considered design is obviously optimized for safety,
even in the event of a first ply failure that can be noticed by pilots
or maintenance crews on the ground.
The simulated attacks have fairly different ply failure behavior.
Both attacks significantly reduce the forces under which the first ply
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θ θ Δθ θ Δθ θ Δθ θ Δθ θ Δθ θ Δθ
1 45 45 0 45 0 46 1 45 0 45 0 45 0
2 -45 -53 -8 -55 -10 -57 -12 -45 0 -45 0 -45 0
3 0 10 10 12 12 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 10 10 12 12 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 10 10 12 12 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 10 10 12 12 14 14 0 0 13 13 37 37
7 90 90 0 90 0 91 1 90 0 90 0 90 0
8 0 11 11 12 12 14 14 33 33 33 33 33 33
9 0 11 11 12 12 14 14 30 30 30 30 30 30
10 0 11 11 12 12 14 14 31 31 31 31 31 31
11 0 11 11 12 12 14 14 9 9 9 9 9 9
12 45 45 0 45 0 45 0 45 0 45 0 45 0
13 -45 -53 -8 -55 -10 -56 -11 -45 0 -45 0 -45 0
14 0 11 11 13 13 14 14 9 9 16 16 25 25
15 0 11 11 13 13 15 15 23 23 34 34 43 43
16 0 11 11 13 13 15 15 32 32 32 32 43 43
17 90 90 0 90 0 91 1 90 0 90 0 90 0
18 90 90 0 90 0 91 1 90 0 90 0 90 0
19 0 11 11 13 13 15 15 32 32 32 32 43 43
20 0 11 11 13 13 15 15 23 23 34 34 43 43
21 0 11 11 13 13 14 14 9 9 16 16 25 25
22 -45 -53 -8 -55 -10 -56 -11 -45 0 -45 0 -45 0
23 45 45 0 45 0 45 0 45 0 45 0 45 0
24 0 11 11 12 12 14 14 9 9 9 9 9 9
25 0 11 11 12 12 14 14 31 31 31 31 31 31
26 0 11 11 12 12 14 14 30 30 30 30 30 30
27 0 11 11 12 12 14 14 33 33 33 33 33 33
28 90 90 0 90 0 91 1 90 0 90 0 90 0
29 0 10 10 12 12 14 14 0 0 13 13 37 37
30 0 10 10 12 12 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 0 10 10 12 12 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
32 0 10 10 12 12 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
33 -45 -53 -8 -55 -10 -57 -12 -45 0 -45 0 -45 0
34 45 45 0 45 0 46 1 45 0 45 0 45 0
Max '+' Δθ: 11 13 15 33 34 43
Max '-' Δθ: -8 -10 -12 0 0 0
# Altered: 26 26 32 14 16 16
Unaltered: 8 8 2 20 18 18
Table 2: Found Optimal Attacks
failure occurs. For all considered scenarios the force is under 1500
N /m in the x direction. Significantly more critical is the follow-up
behavior of the sabotaged composite. The force increment for the
follow-up failure is negligibly small, and it leads to a cascading
failure of the remaining plies. Such behavior of a bad composite
design is known as catastrophic failure. This can obviously lead to
catastrophic consequences, such as the crash of an airplane due to
the broken spar.
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Figure 7: Simulation Results for Ply Failure
6 IDENTIFICATION OF SABOTAGED PARTS
A Ground Vibration Test (GVT) is a non-destructive test commonly
performed in aircraft manufacturing. During GVT, data is obtained
that can be used to model the flexible dynamics of the tested aircraft.
An input force is applied to the aircraft via an electrodynamic
shaker. The resulting excitation is measured by accelerometers
at multiple points across the aircraft. These excitation points are
chosen far away from spar to include both bending and torsion.
The measured force and acceleration data obtained is further post
processed to determine the modal frequencies and mode shapes
using Quadrature Response Method and Curve-Fitting Frequency
Domain Decomposition (CFDD) [32].
The performed sabotage attacks will change the laminate prop-
erties, including its stiffness (see Table 3). The effective orthotropic
modulus E can be calculated using the following equation:
1
E
=
(
1
2ExxEyy
) 1
2
[(
Eyy
Exx
) 1
2 − νyx +
Eyy
2Gxy
] 1
2
(1)
For isotropic material, the modulus of elasticity has an impact
on the fundamental resonance frequency. For a rectangular bar, the
relationship is given by the following equation [33]:
E = 0.9465
(
mf 2
b
) (
L3
t3
)
T (2)
Where m is the mass, b is the width, L is the length, t is the
thickness of the sample, and T is the correction factor depend on
Poisson’s ratio and dimensions of the sample. Since the sabotage
attacks considered in this paper only alter the laminas’ orientation,
keeping all remaining parameters constant, the fundamental reso-
nance frequency is directly proportional to the square root of the
modulus of elasticity:
f ∝
√
E (3)
Based on this relation, we can calculate the ratio of fundamental
resonance frequency change between the original and sabotaged
designs (f /f ′). As frequency is one of parameters to measure and
analyzed during GVT, its significant changes can be used to detect
sabotaged parts. Table 3 summarizes the impact of the sabotage
attacks considered in this paper on this ratio.
For the first category of sabotage attack and reduction of a safety
factor from 1.5 to 1.0 and 0.9, the frequency change is around 10%.
For the second category of sabotage attack, the frequency change
is significantly lower, and can be as little as 4%. However, taking
into account measurement errors and deviations during benign
manufacturing process, it is uncertain whether such slight changes
of frequency can be (i) detected, and (ii) attributed to a sabotage
attack. Nevertheless, we see changes of fundamental resonance
frequency as an important characteristic that could be used to
identify sabotaged parts.
7 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, there are no peer-reviewed publica-
tions focusing directly on security of composite materials. There is,
however, a growing body of literature in a related field, the security
of Additive Manufacturing (AM). The identified threat categories
for AM include Intellectual Property (IP) violation, manufacturing
of legally prohibited objects, and sabotage attacks on manufac-
tured functional parts or manufacturing equipment [28]. For this
paper, only sabotage attacks and related literature are of relevance.
It should be noted that, by the end of 2017, no publications have
addressed security of composite materials [34].
Several publications have analyzed 3D printers and the 3D print-
ing processes for vulnerabilities. Turner et al., 2015 [21] found
that networking and communication systems lack integrity checks
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Ex 128.613 96.993 88.873 77.926 90.172 81.961 71.77
Ey 40.295 42.824 43.523 44.08 41.12 41.204 42.697
Gxy 16.445 16.059 15.787 15.596 22.145 22.483 24.354
0.294 0.328 0.331 0.34 0.38 0.381 0.378
0.092 0.145 0.162 0.188 0.173 0.192 0.225
E 78.25 66.959 63.542 59.836 71.999 68.636 65.62
f/f' 1.08103 1.109716 1.143565 1.042507 1.067742 1.092004
1-f/f' 0.074956 0.098868 0.125542 0.040774 0.063444 0.084252
𝛾𝑥𝑦
𝛾𝑦𝑥
Table 3: Impact of Sabotage Attacks on Laminate Stiffness
and on Fundamental Resonance Frequency
when receiving the design files. Moore et al., 2016 [22] identified
numerous vulnerabilities in software, firmware, and communica-
tion protocol commonly used in desktop 3D printers; these can
be potentially be exploited. Do et al., 2016 [23] have shown that
communication protocols employed by desktop 3D printers can be
exploited, enabling the retrieval of current and previously printed
3D models, halting an active printing job, or submitting a new
one. Belikovetsky et al., 2017 [2] used a phishing attack to install a
backdoor that enabled arbitrary, targeted manipulations of design
files by a remote adversary. Sturm et al., 2014 [6] used malware
pre-installed on a computer to automate the manipulation of STL
files. Moore et al., 2016 [25] used malicious firmware to modify and
substitute a printed 3D model.
A growing body of publications discusses how a manufactured
part’s quality can be compromised. The majority focus on Fused
DepositionModeling (FDM), commonly used in desktop 3D printers.
Sturm et al., 2014 [6] demonstrated that a part’s tensile strength can
be degraded by introducing defects such as voids (internal cavities).
Zeltmann et al., 2016 [8] showed that similar results can be achieved
by printing part of the structure with the contaminated material.
Belikovetsky et al, 2017 [2] proposed degrading a part’s fatigue life;
the authors argue that the defect’s size, geometry, and location are
factors in the degradation. Yampolskiy et al, 2015 [7] argued that the
anisotropy intrinsic to 3D printed parts can be misused to degrade
a part’s quality, if an object is printed in the wrong orientation.
Zeltmann et al., 2016 [8] have experimentally shown the impact
of this attack on a part’s tensile strength, using 90 and 45 degree
rotations of the printed model. Chhetri et al., 2016 [35] introduced a
skew along one of the build axes as an attack. Moore et al., 2016 [25]
modified the amount of extruded source material to compromise
the printed object’s geometry. Yampolskiy et al. [28], based on
the prior joint work with Pope et al., 2016 [27], identified that
indirect manipulations like the modification of network command
timing and energy supply interruptions can be potential means of
sabotaging a part. Yampolskiy et al, 2015 [7] discussed various metal
AM process parameters whose manipulation can sabotage a part’s
quality; for the powder bed fusion (PBF) process, the identified
parameters include heat source energy, scanning strategy, layer
thickness, source material properties like powder size and form, etc.
Yampolskiy et al., 2016 [15] argued that in the case of metal AM,
manipulations of manufacturing parameters can not only sabotage
a part’s quality, but also damage the AM machine, or lead to the
contamination of its environment.
Several publications present methods for detecting sabotage
attacks. Chhetri et al., 2016 [35] used the acoustic side-channel
inherent to the FDM process to detect tampering with a 3D printed
object; the authors report that the detection rate of object modifica-
tions is 77.45%. Belikovetsky et al., 2018 [36] also rely on acoustic
emanations of a FDM 3D printer. Authors define five categories of
atomic modifications at a single G-code command level, and identify
the detectability thresholds for each category. The defined cate-
gories are (a) insertion of a command, (b) deletion of a command,
(c) modification of movement length on the axis, (d) modification
of extruder speed, and (e) re-ordering of G-code commands. Strum
et al., 2017 [37] proposed an impedance-based monitoring method.
The authors physically coupled a piezoceramic (PZT) sensor to the
part being fabricated and measure the electrical impedance of the
PZT. These impedance measurements can be directly linked to the
mechanical impedance of the part, assisting in detecting in-situ
defects of part mass and stiffness. Two further papers built upon
the cross-domain attack notion introduced in Yampolskiy et al.,
2013 [38], and propose a notion of cross-domain attack detection.
Chhetri et al., 2017 [39] demonstrated the flow of information be-
tween the cyber and physical domains and how this information
can be used for performing cross-domain security analysis. By esti-
mating this relationship, the model can be used for the detection of
new cross-domain attack models and attack detection techniques.
Wu et al., 2017 [40] leverage machine learning methods to detect
cyber-attacks in the manufacturing process. The authors have used
vision and acoustics as the data sources for machine learning algo-
rithms and were able to detect anomalies with high accuracy (96.1%
and 91.1% respectively).
8 CONCLUSION
Composite materials often offer better mechanical properties at
lesser weight, as compared to conventional materials. They are pop-
ular in the aerospace, high-end automotive, and defense industries.
Due to the excellent mechanical properties and ability to optimize
these for expected operational conditions, composite materials are
frequently used as functional parts in safety-critical systems, in-
cluding parts of an airplane’s wings or fuselage. In order to ensure
the quality of composite materials under persistent security threats,
it is paramount to understand the properties of potential sabotage
attacks.
In this paper, we focused on sabotage attacks that degrade me-
chanical properties by changing the orientation of individual plies
of composite material. We left all other manufacturing parameters
unaltered. For this category of sabotage attacks, we have defined
two categories of optimal (or minimally invasive) sabotage attacks
that degrade mechanical properties to the desired level: (i) mini-
mal amount of deviation from the original ply orientation, and (ii)
minimal number of plies whose orientation is changed.
For the identification of both sabotage attack categories we have
developed a MATLAB simulation program that takes as input a
sequence of plies, including their material and orientation, and
desired degradation; the output of this program, for each attack
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category, is the changed orientation of plies that would satisfy a
specified degradation of mechanical properties.
We have applied the developed program to the wing spar of
a small-scale 20 seater airplane. Assuming a safety factor (SF ) as
1.5 and desired degraded properties at 1.0, 0.9, and 0.8 of expected
operational conditions, we calculated that the necessary deviations
can be astonishingly small. For the first category of attacks, it is
sufficient to change orientation of all plies by as little as 11 degrees,
13 degrees, or 15 degrees for SF = 1.0, SF = 0.9, and SF = 0.8
scenarios. For the second category of attack, it is sufficient to modify
the orientation of 16 plies, with maximal deviation of 33 degrees,
34 degrees, and 43 degrees for SF = 1.0, SF = 0.9, and SF = 0.8
scenarios.
While from the cyber perspective it sounds like a significant
difference, the ability to detect such attacks is not guaranteed. First
of all, many manufacturers still employ manual quality control. If
every layer is controlled, especially for the first category of attack,
deviations can be small enough to evade detection by human qual-
ity control team. If CNC machines like Automated Fiber Placement
(AFP) and Automated Tape Layup (ATL) are used, a cyber-attack
that changes the design file will both degrade the mechanical prop-
erties and compromise the quality control measures.
Especially critical is the catastrophic failure characteristic of the
sabotaged composite. After the first ply failure, the force increment
for the follow-up failure is negligibly small, and it leads to almost
immediate destruction of all remaining plies. This undermines a
critical characteristic of composite material design, progressive
failure. Such rapid failure could easily lead to disasters, such as
airplanes crashing from a failed wing spar.
REFERENCES
[1] N. Falliere, L. O’Murchu and E. Chien, W32.Stuxnet Dossier, Version 1.4, Syman-
tec, Mountain View, California, 2011.
[2] S. Belikovetsky, M. Yampolskiy, J. Toh, J. Gatlin and Yuval Elovici, dr0wned –
Cyber-Physical Attack with Additive Manufacturing, Proceedings of the 11th
USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies, 2017.
[3] Boeing, Boeing 787 Dreamliner By Design, Chicago, IL (http://www.boeing.com/
commercial/787/by-design/), 2017.
[4] K. Hyonny, D. Whisler, Z.M. Chen, C. Bisagni, M. Kawai, and R. Krueger Pro-
ceedings of the American Society for Composites 2014-Twenty-ninth Technical
Conference on Composite Materials, 2014.
[5] E. Witten, T. Kraus, and M. Kühnel, Composites Market Report 2016. Market
developments, trends, outlook, and challenges (http://www.eucia.eu/userfiles/
files/20161128_market_report_2016_english.pdf), 2016.
[6] L. Sturm, C. Williams, J. Camelio, J. White and R. Parker, Cyber-physical vunera-
bilities in additive manufacturing systems, Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Inter-
national Solid Freeform Fabrication Symposium, 2014.
[7] M. Yampolskiy, L. Schutzle, U. Vaidya and A. Yasinsac, Security challenges of
additivemanufacturingwithmetals and alloys, inCritical Infrastructure Protection
IX, M. Rice and S. Shenoi (Eds.), Springer, Heidelberg, Germany, pp. 169–183,
2015.
[8] S.E. Zeltmann, N. Gupta, N.G. Tsoutsos, M. Maniatakos, J. Rajendran, and R.
Karri, Manufacturing and Security Challenges in 3D Printing, The Journal of The
Minerals, Metals & Materials Society , vol. 68(7), pp. 1872–1881, 2016.
[9] J. Sloan, ATL & AFP: Defining the megatrends in composite aerostructures, High
performance composites, vol. 16(4), p. 68, 2008.
[10] H.J. Dirk, C. Ward, K.D. Potter, The engineering aspects of automated prepreg
layup: History, present and future, Composites Part B: Engineering, vol. 43(3), pp.
997–1009, 2012.
[11] A. Beakou, M. Cano, J.B. Le Cam and V. Verney, Modelling slit tape buckling
during automated prepreg manufacturing: A local approach, Composite structures,
vol. 93(10), pp. 2628–2635, 2011.
[12] M.N. Grimshaw, C.G. Grant and J.M. Diaz, Advanced technology tape laying for
affordable manufacturing of large composite structures, In International sampe
symposium and exhibition, pp. 2484–2494, 2001.
[13] P. Debout, H. Chanal and E. Duc, Tool path smoothing of a redundant machine:
Application to Automated Fiber Placement, Computer-Aided Design, vol. 43(2),
pp. 22–132, 2011.
[14] D. Maass, Progress in automated ply inspection of AFP layups, Reinforced Plastics,
vol. 59(5), pp. 242–245, 2015.
[15] M. Yampolskiy, A. Skjellum, M. Kretzschmar, R.A. Overfelt, K. Sloan and A. Yasin-
sac, Using 3D Printers as Weapons, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure
Protection, vol. 14, pp. 58–71, 2016.
[16] M. Yampolskiy, T. Andel, J. McDonald, W. Glisson and A. Yasinsac, Intellectual
property protection in additive layer manufacturing: Requirements for secure
outsourcing, Proceedings of the Fourth Program Protection and Reverse Engineering
Workshop, article no. 7, 2014.
[17] M.A. Al Faruque, S.R. Chhetri, A. Canedo and J. Wan, Acoustic Side-Channel
Attacks on Additive Manufacturing Systems, Proceedings of the 7th International
Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems, pp. 1–10, 2016.
[18] M.A. Al Faruque, S.R. Chhetri, A. Canedo and J. Wan, Forensics of Thermal
Side-Channel in Additive Manufacturing Systems, (http://cecs.uci.edu/files/2016/
01/CECS-TR-01-16.pdf), pp. 1–10, 2016.
[19] C. Song, F. Lin, Z. Ba, K. Ren, C. Zhou and W. Xu, My smartphone knows what
you print: Exploring smartphone-based side-channel attacks against 3d printers,
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSACConference on Computer and Communications
Security, pp. 895–907, 2016.
[20] A. Hojjati, A. Adhikari, K. Struckmann, E. Chou, T.N. Tho Nguyen, K. Madan,
M.S. Winslett, C.A. Gunter and W.P. King, Leave Your Phone at the Door: Side
Channels that Reveal Factory Floor Secrets, Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 883–894, 2016.
[21] H. Turner, J. White, J.A. Camelio, C. Williams, B. Amos and R. Parker, Bad Parts:
Are Our Manufacturing Systems at Risk of Silent Cyberattacks?, IEEE Security &
Privacy, vol. 13(3), pp. 40–47, 2015.
[22] S. Moore, P. Armstrong, T. McDonald and M. Yampolskiy, Vulnerability analysis
of desktop 3D printer software, Proceedings of the Resilience Week, pp. 46–51,
2016.
[23] Q. Do, B. Martini and K-K.R. Choo, A data exfiltration and remote exploitation
attack on consumer 3D printers, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security, vol. 11(10), pp. 2174–2186, 2016.
[24] C. Xiao, Security Attack to 3D Printing, Keynote at XCon2013 (http://www.
claudxiao.net/Attack3DPrinting-Claud-en.pdf), 2013.
[25] S.B. Moore, W.B. Glisson andM. Yampolskiy, Implications of Malicious 3D Printer
Firmware, Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System
Sciences, pp. 6089–6098, 2017.
[26] A. Slaughter, M. Yampolskiy, M. Matthews, W.E. King, G. Guss and Y. Elovici,
How to Ensure Bad Quality in Metal Additive Manufacturing: In-Situ Infrared
Thermography from the Security Perspective, Proceedings of the 12th International
Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, pp. 78:1-78:10, 2017.
[27] G. Pope and M. Yampolskiy, A Hazard Analysis Technique for Additive Man-
ufacturing, Better Software East Conference, (https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/
1706/1706.00497.pdf), 2016.
[28] M. Yampolskiy, W.E. King, G. Pope, S. Belikovetsky and Y. Elovici, EVALUATION
OF ADDITIVE AND SUBTRACTIVEMANUFACTURING FROM THE SECURITY
PERSPECTIVE, inCritical Infrastructure Protection XI, M. Rice and S. Shenoi (Eds.),
Springer, Heidelberg, Germany, pp. 23–44, 2017.
[29] A. Ramsaroop and K. Kanny, Using MATLAB to Design and Analyse Composite
Lami-nates, Engineering, vol. 2(11), pp. 904-916, 2010.
[30] C. Kong, H. Park, Y. Kim and K. Kang, Structural Design on Wing of a Small
Scale WIG Vehicle with Carbon/Epoxy and Foam Sandwich Composite Structure,
16th International Conference on Composite Materials, pp. 1–8, 2007.
[31] A.K. Kaw, Mechanics of composite materials, CRC press, 2005.
[32] A. Gupta, P. Seiler and B. Danowsky, Ground Vibration Tests on a Flexible Flying
Wing Aircraft, AIAA Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference, pp. 2016–1753,
2016.
[33] S. Tognana, W. Salgueiro, A. Somoza and A. Marzocca, Measurement of the
Young’s modulus in particulate epoxy composites using the impulse excitation
technique,Materials Science and Engineering: A, vol. 527(18), pp. 4619–4623, 2010.
[34] M. Yampolskiy, W.E. King, J. Gatlin, S. Belikovetsky, A. Brown, A. Skjellum and
Y. Elovici, Security of Additive Manufacturing: Attack Taxonomy and Survey,
Additive Manufacturing, 2018.
[35] S.R. Chhetri, A. Canedo and M.A. Al Faruque, KCAD: kinetic cyber-attack detec-
tion method for cyber-physical additive manufacturing systems, Proceedings of
the 35th International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, pp. 1–8, 2016.
[36] . Belikovetsky, Y. Solewicz, M. Yampolskiy, J. Toh and Yuval Elovici, Digital Audio
Signature for 3D Printing Integrity, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security, 2018.
[37] L. Sturm, M. Albakri, C.B. Williams and P. Tarazaga, In-situ Detection of Build
Defects in Additive Manufacturing via Impedance-Based Monitoring, Proceedings
of the 27th International Solid Freeform Fabrication Symposium, pp. 1458–1478,
2016.
10
[38] M. Yampolskiy, P. Horvath, X. Koutsoukos, Y. Xue and J. Sztipanovits, Taxonomy
for descriptions of cross-domain attacks on CPSs, Proceedings of the Second ACM
International Conference on High Confidence Networked Systems, pp. 135–142,
2013.
[39] S.R. Chhetri, J. Wan and M.A. Al Faruque, Cross-domain security of cyber-
physical systems, Proceedings of the 22ndAsia and South Pacific Design Automation
Conference, pp. 200–205, 2017.
[40] M. Wu, Z. Song and Y.B. Moon, Detecting cyber-physical attacks in Cyber-
Manufacturing systems with machine learning methods, Journal of Intelligent
Manufacturing, pp. 1–13, 2017.
A CALCULATING MECHANICAL
PROPERTIES: HOOKE’S LAW FOR A
TWO-DIMENSIONAL ANGLE LAMINA
Figure 3 shows the local and global axes of an angle lamina. 1-2
represents the local coordinate axes whereas x-y represents the
global coordinate axes. 1 lies along the fiber length direction, which
represents longitudinal direction. 2 is normal to the fiber length
and represents transverse direction for the lamina. Together they
represent the principal material directions in the plane of the lamina.
Axis 3, which is transverse to both the fiber axis and the plane of
the lamina, is not shown in the figure as the lamina is considered
two dimensional. The global coordinate system (x-y) is related to
the local coordinate system by the angle (Θ).
Laminas have low strength and stiffness in the transverse direc-
tion. So, angled laminas are placed in the laminate to overcome
these properties. Fiber reinforced composites are inhomogeneous
and non-isotropic (orthotropic) in nature; therefore, Hooke’s law
(σ = Eϵ) cannot be applied directly. The stress-strain equations for
orthotropic lamina in both the local and global coordinate systems
are given by Equations 4 and 5, respectively [31].
σ1
σ2
τ12
 =

Q11 Q12 0
Q21 Q22 0
0 0 Q66


ϵ1
ϵ2
γ12
 (4)
σx
σy
τxy
 =

Q11 Q12 Q16
Q21 Q22 Q26
Q16 Q26 Q66


ϵx
ϵy
γxy
 (5)
where σ ϵ are the normal stress and strain; 1,2 are the direction;
τ12 and γ12 are the shear stress and strain in the plane 1-2. [Q] is
the reduced stiffness matrix; x, y are the directions of normal stress
and strain; τxy and γxy are the shear stress and strain in the x-y
plane; [Q] is the transformed reduced stiffness matrix.
The elements of the reduced stiffness matrix in Equation 4 are
functions of the material constants and calculated as:
Q11 =
E1
1 − ν12ν21 ,Q12 =
ν12E2
1 − ν12ν21 ,Q22 =
E2
1 − ν12ν21 ,Q66 = G12
(6)
Where E is the Young’s modulus; 1,2 are direction; G12 is the
shear modulus in 1-2 plane; ν12 and ν21 are the Poison’s ratios in
the 1-2 and 2-1 planes.
The transformed reduced stiffness matrix [Q] used in the Equa-
tion 5 can be determined by:
[Q] = [T ]−1[Q][R][T ][R]−1 (7)
Where [T ] and [R] are transformation and Reuter matrices which
are given as:
[T ] =

c2 s2 2cs
s2 c2 −2sc
−sc sc c2 − s2
 ,and [R] =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 2
 (8)
Where, c = cos(Θ), s = sin(Θ). The relationship between the lo-
cal stress and strain, from the Equation 4, and the global stress and
strain is given by Equation 9.

σx
σy
τxy
 = [T ]
−1

σ1
σ2
τ12
 ,and

ϵ1
ϵ2
γ12
 = [R][T ][R]
−1

ϵx
ϵy
γxy
 (9)
From the Equations above we can determine the stress and strain
for a single lamina. However, composite laminates are composed
of various laminas so Equation 10 is set up for laminate.[
N
M
]
=
[
A B
B D
] [
ϵ0
k
]
(10)
Where, N is the normal resultant forces (per unit width);M is the
bending moment’s resultant (per unit width); ϵ0 is the mid-plane
normal strains; k is the mid-plane curvatures. Mid-plane strains and
mid-plane curvatures have relation with global coordinate system
by Equation 11:

ϵx
ϵy
γxy
 =

ϵ0x
ϵ0y
γ 0xy
 + z

kx
ky
kxy
 (11)
Where z is the distance from the mid-plane in the thickness
direction. It is considered positive in the downward direction (see
Figure 2).
The [A], [B], and [D] matrices in the Equation 10 are called
extensional stiffness matrix, coupling stiffness matrix, and bending
stiffness matrix for the laminate, respectively. The Equations 12
through 14 can be used to calculate these matrices.
Ai j =
n∑
k=1
[(Qi j )]k (hk − hk−1) (12)
Bi j =
1
2
n∑
k=1
[(Qi j )]k (h2k − h2k−1) (13)
Di j =
1
3
n∑
k=1
[(Qi j )]k (h3k − h3k−1) (14)
Wheren is the number of lamina; [(Qi j )]k is the i-th, j-th element
of the matrix [Q] for the k-th layer; i, j = 1, 2, 3; hk is the distance
from the laminate midplane to the bottom of the k-th lamina. The
sign convention used for hk is positive below the mid-plane and
negative above the mid-plane (see Figure 2).
Among the various failure theories applied to composite struc-
tures, Tsai-Wu failure theory is considered more general and closely
correlated with the experimental data [4]. According to this fail-
ure theory, the lamina is considered to be failed if Equation 15 is
violated.
11
H1σ1+H2σ2+H6τ12+H11σ
2
1 +H11σ
2
2 +H66τ
2
12+2H12σ1σ2 < 1 (15)
The components of the Tsai-Wu failure theory are determined
using the five strength parameters of a unidirectional lamina which
are given by Equations 16 through 18:
H1 =
1
(σT1 )ult
− 1(σC1 )ult
;H2 =
1
(σT2 )ult
− 1(σC2 )ult
;H6 = 0 (16)
H11 =
1
(σT1 )ult ∗ (σC1 )ult
;H22 =
1
(σT2 )ult ∗ (σC2 )ult
;H66 =
1
(τ12)2ult
(17)
H12 = −12
√
1
(σT1 )ult ∗ (σC1 )ult ∗ (σT2 )ult ∗ (σC2 )ult
(18)
Where (σT1,2)ult is the ultimate tensile stress in 1 and 2 direction;
(σC1,2)ult is the ultimate compressive stress in 1 and 2 direction;
(τ12)ult is the ultimate shear stress in 1-2 plane.
Strength Ratio (SR) is defined as
SR =
Maximum Load which Can be Applied
Load Applied
(19)
When SR > 1, the lamina is safe and the applied stress can be
increased. If SR <= 1, the lamina is unsafe and the applied stress
needs to be reduced. For example, SR value of 1.8 means that loading
can be increased up to 80% without failure. The concept of SR is
applied to any failure theory. For the better use of this theory each
stress component in Equation 15 was multiplied by SR and resulted
an Equation 20 [29].
(H1σ1+H2σ2+H6τ12)SR+(H11σ 21+H11σ 22+H66τ 212+2H12σ1σ2)SR2 < 1
(20)
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